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This article draws on original empirical research to explore the politics of  experimental feminist 
statutes. It has two main aims. First, it traces how conventional legislative drafting techniques 
have participated in the wider social creation and continuance of  sex/gender norms. It shows 
how dominant statutory expressions of  sex and gender that might otherwise appear timeless 
have shifted with social change and legal innovation. The article contributes to debates in 
feminist legal studies, legal anthropology, and legislative drafting by making visible, and analysing 
the particular power of  legislative text, its ‘alchemy’, in expressing and re-creating sex/gender as 
a social, cultural and political artefact. Second, drawing on this research, the article explores what 
the Future of  Legal Gender project might consider and do when drafting an experimental statute to 
decertify legal gender. Addressing questions of  positionality, believability, legal form and the use 
of  potentially innovative or contested drafting techniques (the singular “they”, the second 
person), the article explores tensions between legislative drafting and feminist legal method, as 
well as the benefits for bringing feminist analysis and perspectives to this important aspect of  
legal practice. Given that legislative drafting does not merely inscribe pre-agreed policy ideas into 
legal text but helps to shape emerging ontologies of  gender, then drafting an experimental 
statute invites feminists to pay attention to interlinked questions of  substance and form in the 




… what I really want is for all the many gendered possibilities in the world to be, not 
normal, but rather profoundly ordinary and familiar. (Eli Clare, 2015, p.xxviii) 
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Feminist legal research aims to understand how law shapes and limits social life, creating 
inequalities through gendered norms, practices and processes. This article contributes to such 
debates by exploring how legislative drafting supports the social construction of  sex/gender – in 
other words how the writing of  statutes has both drawn on and created powerful sex/gender 
norms.1 Legislative drafting is the practice of  writing primary or secondary legislation for later 
debate in Parliament and, depending on the outcome of  those debates, eventual enactment into 
law.2 As is evident from the current special issue, for the past two years I have been working on 
the Future of  Legal Gender project, an interdisciplinary research project that critically explores ways 
to reform the status of  sex/gender in the law of  England and Wales.3 Our research is currently 
engaged with thinking through what it would mean for feminist legal scholarship and activism if  
gender were decertified in law – in other words, if  the state no longer officially determined, 
guaranteed or registered required sex/gender and changed the law to reflect this (see further 
Cooper and Renz, 2016). What would be the implications for feminist politics if  sex and gender 
were dis-attached from a legal edifice that stretches through the life course? This is an 
experimental or ‘prefigurative’ initiative, in other words, which engages with present and legal 
policy debates through a law reform question that has ‘not yet officially been asked’ (see Cooper, 
2018, 2020).  
                                                                
1 I am using the term sex/gender for two reasons. First, sex/gender refers to the mutual inter-relationship between 
concepts, embodied experiences, and social processes that support sex and gender. This term acknowledges the 
power of processes of social gendering, which often incorporate dominant concepts about sex and in turn have very 
strongly affected how sex has been interpreted as a ‘fact’ by a wide range of social actors. Second, across many 
statutes and in wider literatures on legislative drafting, the terms sex and gender have not been used consistently to 
reference distinct social, physical or other facts or meanings. In this sense, I also use the term to reference the 
conceptual, semantic, and political unsteadiness of the words ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. Where necessary in the article, I 
refer to the precise term that drafters, statutes, or commentators themselves use. 
2 Some forms of secondary legislation do not require debate in Parliament. See further: 
https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/secondary-legislation/ (last accessed 24 September 2020). 
3 See further: https://futureoflegalgender.kcl.ac.uk/ 






 Part of  such an inquiry is to create an experimental statute that performs the 
‘decertification’ of  sex/gender.  As such, the current article draws on in-depth interviews with 
legislative drafters and feminist legal scholars to explore the politics of  drafting sex/gender.4 
This is an engagement with text and form; drafting as feminist method. My research in this area 
has led to the belief  that legal substance and legal form are inextricably linked, and that we might 
usefully pay attention to the power of  drafting itself  as much as our prefigurative thinking and 
substantive suggestions for law reform. Given this, I have two main aims in the present article. 
The first is to explore what legislative drafting does, and has done, to participate in the wider 
social creation and continuance of  sex/gender norms. As the article shows, dominant 
expressions of  sex and gender in statutes that might otherwise appear timeless have shifted with 
social change, legal innovation and new bureaucratic forms. Whilst legislative drafting experts 
and socio-legal scholars have explored the history of  sex and gender categories in legislative 
drafting practice (Petersson, 1999, 1998), as well as the politics of  gender neutral (King and 
Fawcett, 2018; Wilson, 2011; Xanthaki, 2019) and gender silent (Revell and Vapnek, 2020) 
drafting, this article focuses on the particular power of  legislative text, what I come to term later 
on in the article its particular ‘alchemy’ in expressing, performing, and re-creating sex/gender as 
a social, cultural and political artefact.  
 This is a distinct approach to legislative drafting that engages feminist legal scholarship in 
dialogue with debates in legal anthropology about the ‘agency of  legal form’ (Riles, 2016, p. 808): 
the power of  legal knowledge to shape social reality.5 As Annelise Riles puts it: ‘we can speak of  
                                                                
4 This article draws on the data from one double interview and four single interviews of drafters and drafting 
experts in England, Wales, Scotland, Australia, and New Zealand, which took place between April 2018 and July 
2020. Interviews were secured on the basis of longstanding research contacts, performed in person or via Skype, and 
transcribed for later analysis. This represents an adequate sample for the purposes of this article as the international 
community of legislative counsel is small and interviews with currently practicing drafters, in particular, are difficult 
to secure. In-depth interviews were also performed in the same period with five feminist scholars with experience in 
feminist judgment projects or legislative drafting. Care has been taken to anonymise participants unless particular 
identifying information is needed to explain context.  
5 Such an enquiry will in future turn to Marxist debates about legal form and their relation to capitalist modes of 
production, through engaging with the work of Evgeny Pashukanis and others. Many thanks to Davina Cooper for 






legal categories and techniques as generative of  certain kinds of  social, political, and 
epistemological realities’ (Riles, 2016, p. 808). My aim in this article is to connect feminist 
concerns and experiments with legislative drafting to scholarship in legal anthropology and 
socio-legal studies that analyses the craft, politics and institutional dynamics of  legislative 
drafting for their effects on the making of  law and legal subjects (Pottage, 2014; Pottage and 
Mundy, 2004). Legislative drafting techniques have not been consequence-free for feminists; they 
have helped usher in specific legal and textual formations with attached concepts and ontologies 
that have travelled far and combined with other long-lasting bureaucratic and wider social 
understandings of  sex and gender.  As such, we might try to understand not only how legislative 
drafting has apparently responded to social changes concerning sex/gender equality – for 
example through ‘gender neutral drafting’ – but also how the sex/gender constructions and 
innovations used in drafting themselves support complex wider social processes of  gendering.  
 The second, related, aim is to explore what feminists are engaging with when we 
participate in the act of  drafting an experimental statute. If  legislative drafting does not merely 
inscribe pre-agreed policy ideas into legal text but helps to shape emerging ontologies of  gender, 
then both form and substantive content are important aspects of  prefigurative feminist legal 
projects such as the Future of  Legal Gender. Here, the argument is that the method matters: the act 
of  writing an experimental statute pulls us into relationships, norms, professional debates, and 
epistemologies of  expertise and governance that are likely to fundamentally affect what we think 
is possible and what we can achieve. Over the past decade or so, feminist engagements with law 
have increasingly turned to legal form, engaging with judgments in many jurisdictions, for 
example, through ‘feminist judgments projects’ that adopt or challenge the traditional 
conventions of  judicial reasoning to varying degrees in exploring what it would mean to create 
law otherwise (Enright et al., 2017; Hunter et al., 2010). Feminists have often also engaged in 
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law-writing projects, either as part of  established international legal processes, for example (Riles, 
2006), or as a means of  working through an aspirational text for feminist law reform purposes, 
as was the case with an aspirational ‘model for change’ for feminist abortion law reform in 
Ireland, drafted in 2015 by a group of  feminist legal academics in advance of  the successful 
campaign to repeal the Eighth Amendment to the Irish constitution, thereby paving the way for 
the removal of  the constitutional ban on abortion (Enright et al., 2015a, 2015b). Inspired by 
such engagements, my aim is to foster debate about the meaning, potential and pitfalls of  
legislative drafting for feminist purposes. What understanding of  statutory law and its gendering 
power does this task bring with it? What opportunities and drawbacks attend such initiatives and 
what do they bring forth? 
 In the following sections, I introduce the practice of  legislative drafting and then tell one 
of  many stories that could potentially be told across diverse jurisdictions and colonial contexts 
about the relationship of  sex/gender to legislative drafting – the story of  the development of  
certain approaches to sex and gender in English law culminating in current debates over gender-
neutral drafting. Whilst gender-neutral drafting and other similar techniques might appear to do 
little to shape the substantive content of  statute, they are enmeshed in powerful webs of  
gendered norms, meaning, and symbolism that provide useful material for feminists to consider. 
I begin by tracing the genealogy of  the ‘he or she’ construction, an expression with its own 
attached epistemologies that have been formed through shifting relationships with the use (or 
not) of  binary gender pronouns. Drawing on feminist research into the long history of  legislative 
drafting, I then outline the distinct contribution of  interpretation legislation to the legal drafting 
of  gender, before engaging with original interview data to discuss more recent approaches to 
‘gender neutral drafting’ that have evolved since the formal adoption by the previous UK Labour 
government of  a gender-neutral drafting policy in 2007. The article concludes by setting out 






some issues, opportunities, and challenges that the project may face when drafting an 
experimental statute decertifying legal gender. 
 
The Message in the Medium 
 
Our language and our grammar is gender-specific. There is nothing we can do about that. 
(Legislative drafting expert, 2019) 
 
Because law is made up of words: words which are written in constitutions, statutes, reported 
decisions and negotiated agreements, and words which are spoken in courts and tribunals and 
other professional settings by lawyers and adjudicators, the use of language is fundamental to 
law. (Mossman, 1995, p. 8)  
 
Legislative drafting has a long institutional history and a foundational role in contemporary law-
making (see Greenberg, 2011). In the United Kingdom, drafters now work in legislative counsel 
offices in London, Cardiff, Edinburgh, and at Stormont. Drafters write, rewrite, and settle the 
text of  legislation in collaboration with government departments, testing instructions they 
receive from government lawyers, providing advice on the structure and likely effects of  
different legislative models and expressions, and drafting amendments where necessary 
(Greenberg, 2011; Page, 2009; Xanthaki, 2015, 2014). The technical expertise of  drafters is a 
common theme in conversations with lawyers and ministers, and it instantiates the drafting phase 
as an important process through which policy is materialised into legally effective language 
(Grabham, 2016; Xanthaki, 2014). 
 It is relevant for our project that the work of  drafters is still understood as highly 
technical and quite unique within the legal system as a whole (Greenberg, 2011). We should be 






wary of  assumptions that this technical focus somehow obviates the political significance of  
drafting more broadly. Indeed, drafters have long been engaged in a struggle over the extent to 
which changing social experiences and definitions of  sex and gender should be reflected, or 
made effective, through legislation. Current debates about sex/gender and drafting have emerged 
from specific epistemologies of  gender and structural discrimination, specific ways of  imagining 
the political and social struggle of  sex/gender inequalities as they relate to law, which have been 
especially influential since the late 1960s and 1970s, as second wave feminism began to permeate 
academic and legal professional circles. As will become clear, over the past few decades, 
professional communities of  drafters and drafting experts have created technical solutions to 
these social struggles, mobilising their own legal practice in adjusting drafting to ameliorate, or at 
least not exacerbate, such gendered harms. As such, one object of  our current study – 
understanding the potential role of  drafting as a tool to pose an “as if ” question – emerges 
against the backdrop of  innovation and controversy in legislative drafting that has been, to very 
different degrees, responsive and future-oriented in terms of  gender expression and inequalities, 
conjuring sex/gender as an object of  attention in many different ways. The idea of  one ‘best 
practice’ approach does not describe the plural, almost polyphonic sets of  techniques and 
arguments on this issue that continue into the present. Rather than attempting to make sense of  
these productively rowdy debates and ontologies, we are hoping to use them as resources when 
drafting our own experimental statute. Yet in order to understand the legal and social context for 
these debates, we need to understand the contexts that have produced them. As such, this 
section provides a brief  history of  gender and legislative drafting, culminating in feminist 
challenges to the use of  interpretation legislation to inculcate a ‘masculine rule’ in drafting. 
 
  






“He or She” 
A key assertion of this article is that the genres of sex/gender that have become so much a part 
of our institutional, social and cultural landscape have often been co-constructed through legal, 
textual, innovations. As such, they are also likely to change in the future. Take, for example, the 
idea that binary oppositions of  ‘he or she’ should provide a natural linguistic background to our 
conceptualisation of  sex and gender and should structure our legal treatment of  gendered 
experience and obligations. The ‘he or she’ binary is ubiquitous within social expression and legal 
and public texts (see further Cameron, 1985; Mills et al., 2011). As a feature of  professional 
courteous language, it seems to reference an androcentric natural order that politely opens the 
door to women, signalling a public-facing yet essentially patriarchal type of  post-World War Two 
inclusion, with its tone almost of  surprise, self-arrest, or afterthought (“or she”). Yet the use of  
apparently binary gender pronouns has a long institutional history in English law, dating back to 
the mid-1500s if  not earlier. And over that time, the politics surrounding the binary and its 
attachment to law have shifted several times, revealing multiple overlapping ontologies of  sex 
and gender along the way. This is a story not only about centuries of  sex/gender inequality in 
English law, but also about the unsteady grammatical basis for an apparently natural binary, and 
its relationship with the innovation and operation of  interpretation acts as a modernist legal 
project.   
 The story weaves in and out of  third person pronouns. Feminist legal scholars have long 
pointed to the problems occasioned by the lack of  a non-gendered singular third person in the 
English language. The singular and plurals of  both the first (I/we) and the second person (you) 
are not explicitly gendered. The third person is gendered in the singular (he/she) but not in the 
plural (they) (e.g., Mossman, 1995, p. 10).6 I return to this point later on when considering the 
potential for disruptive feminist drafting techniques. Legislation is written in the third person, so 
                                                                
6 The singular ‘they’ is discussed further below. 






the conditions exist for gendered differences to be inevitably structured into the text of  the law 
itself  through the use of  binary, gender-specific pronouns. Yet, as Petersson demonstrates, the 
picture is not quite as straightforward as this might suggest. English law shows a history of  
highly variable sex/gender pronouns as language has evolved, along with distinct changes in how 
law has attached legal responsibility to these gender markers through statutory drafting 
(Petersson, 1998). In Middle English (1150-1500), pronouns changed considerably. In Old 
English, hé referred to the masculine and héo to the feminine. For part of  Middle English, when 
the ‘o’ was dropped, masculine and feminine nominative pronouns were phonetically 
indistinguishable and ‘he’ was both masculine and feminine (Petersson, 1998, p. 96). Later, 
distinct pronunciations and spellings distinguished, again, between masculine and feminine such 
that late Middle English saw the prevailing use of  sche for the feminine (Petersson, 1998, p. 96). 
Using vagrancy law as an example, Petersson shows that for many centuries, male terms were not 
consistently used in statutory drafting to represent women. By contrast, following an initial 
period of  inconsistent pronoun use, a system of  using female terms to represent women 
emerged in the Elizabethan period with the Vagrancy Act 1572 and continued to the Vagrancy 
Act 1744. Differences in wording in the 1824 version of  the Act made it even clearer when 
provisions applied distinctly to women.   
 The shift towards distinct gender pronoun use in the Elizabethan period could not have 
happened without the distinctions between nominative pronouns that had been reintroduced 
into Middle English. As such, changes to statutory drafting – and the legal conceptualisation of  
identity along gendered lines – were dependent in part on the evolution of  the English language. 
Through the use of  phrases such as “hee or shee” and “his or her” when both sexes were 
targeted, and “he” or “she” when one sex was targeted, Elizabethan vagrancy laws referenced 
very real differences in status between men and women at that time (Petersson, 1998). Petersson 
terms this the ‘system of  express reference’. The point about the system of  express reference 






was that it recognised women’s distinct legal status under law, even as this status was often 
subordinate to men. For example, in the Vagrancy Act 1572, provisions suspending punishments 
for vagrancy on the basis of  a property threshold were addressed only to men, and not to 
women, because women could not at that time legally hold property in their own name 
(Petersson, 1998, p. 98). Subordinate status therefore did not reside in legal invisibility or 
occlusion under an androcentric norm, it existed in plain daylight. When a statute affected both 
men and women, it would often employ both masculine and feminine pronouns.  
 
Interpretation Legislation: Modernisation Through the ‘Masculine Rule’ 
The system of  express reference gave way to a new set of  drafting norms  – the ‘masculine rule’ 
– through an era of  reform in the 1800s, through which interpretation statutes were used to pare 
down the statute book, making legislation more consistent.7 This was part of  overall efforts to 
render the statute book more manageable through a push to standardise and universalise 
common legal terms and definitions. The masculine rule was first introduced in the United 
Kingdom in 1827 and included reference to the feminine within references to the masculine. 
Interpretation statutes had previously been enacted in several British colonies (Petersson, 1998, 
p. 103). As Sarah Keenan has shown, this process of  colonial experimentation was at the heart 
of  many modern law reform initiatives – such as land title registration, for example (Keenan, 
2017). This should make us attentive to the colonial histories and ongoing effects of  large-scale 
law reform projects such as interpretation legislation itself.8  
Through a general wave of  interpretation legislation in the 1850s and later, common 
defined words that were found throughout legislation were gathered together in a separate 
                                                                
7 Contemporary writing on interpretation statutes still references its objects of simplification, the avoidance of 
repetition, the promotion of consistency of form and language, and the clarification of laws’ effects (see Xanthaki, 
2013, p. 127). 
8 This point is the focus of ongoing research and due to limitations of space, will be addressed in future 
publications. 






statute that was to apply to all others. And as Petersson points out, the masculine rule was one 
of  the earliest and most widely deployed examples of  all the efforts at universal interpretation. 
However, legislative innovations and norms such as this were in constant tension with wider 
social movements. Feminist legal activists were not dissuaded by the masculine rule in their 
efforts to achieve the vote, and indeed its inclusion within the Abbreviation Act 1850 led to an 
anxious flurry when some legislators perceived it as a threat to male-only entitlements. In a 
Parliamentary debate in 1851 over a proposed repeal bill on this point, it was argued that one 
consequence of  the rule would be to allow women the vote through reading women into those 
given voting entitlement (Petersson, 1998, p. 107). These fears were later realised when 5,347 
Manchester women claimed the right to be put on the voting list on the basis that the 
Representation of  the People Act 1867 should be read in conjunction with the masculine rule in 
the 1850 Act so as to read women into the grant of  the franchise to ‘every man’ with certain 
qualifications.9 In this case, Chorlton v Lings (1868), the court stated that the legislature would not 
grant the franchise to women on the basis of  an interpretation act. Reading against the apparent 
meaning of  the masculine rule, the judges reasserted the common law incapacities of  women, 
including in relation to voting and public office (Ritchie, 1975, p. 694). Through important 
subsequent cases dealing with women’s inclusion within political and professional realms, the 
potentially radical effects of  the masculine rule were asserted by feminists, only to be limited by 
judges’ use of  context-related arguments (Ritchie, 1975). This was in part due to the rule’s clarity, 
inclusivity and universal nature, which leant it to arguments that if  all legal subjects were male, 
then all legal subjects should benefit from male entitlements. 
The argument here is that the apparently naturalistic and ubiquitous “he or she” binary 
found in much contemporary legislation and bureaucratic writing has a long and complex history, 
referencing fractious relationships between women’s distinct and subordinate status in law, 
                                                                
9 Chorlton v Lings (1868) L.R. 4. C.P. 374. See further Ritchie (1975, p. 693). 






gendered language (the very construction of  nominative pronouns), and techniques for 
expressing sex and gender within statutes. The advent of  interpretation acts forced the issue, 
occluding specific reference to genders based on distinct perceived social status or 
responsibilities with the ‘masculine rule.’ And the rule itself  quickly became vulnerable to 
feminist legal attempts to re-seize the universal in pursuit of  the franchise and other elements of  
civic status. Yet despite these flurries of  contestation, the masculine rule continued in the 
background over subsequent decades, driving drafting in such a way as to ‘promote uniformity’, 
constructing the legal sphere as apparently androcentric. As this drafter put it: 
The first Interpretation Act was 1850 … (t)he aim of the first act and subsequent ones is to 
promote uniformity. If you had within the Interpretation Act “he includes she”, that would 
obviously drive the drafting in a certain way. The people who hitherto said “he or she” - 
because it wasn't clear if they said “he” it meant men - would depart from that approach on 
the basis of now the background against which we’re legislating is this Interpretation Act. 
(Interview with legislative drafter, 2019) 
 
Feminism and the Language of  Law: A ‘Contaminated’ Magic? 
As the previous section has shown, the practices, institutional dynamics, relations, 
epistemologies, and innovations associated with legislative drafting have helped fabricate diverse 
ontologies of  sex/gender we see circulating in law at present. For reasons of  brevity, this section 
turns to the question of  how second wave feminists challenged legal language, with new and 
distinct perspectives on the politics of  legislative drafting. Motivated by feminist attention to 
gendering language (e.g., Martyna, 1980; Spender, 1980), lawyers and legal scholars from the 
1960s onwards opposed the occlusion caused by the continued use of  specific interpretation 
rules. Canadian drafters and scholars watched as a now-famous debate played out in the pages of  
the McGill Law Review in the mid 1970s between the revered Canadian drafter Elmer Dreidger 






and the feminist lawyer Margeurite Ritchie QC, who differed on the question of  whether the 
Canadian federal Interpretation Act 1970 had failed to protect women in the context of  feminist 
protests about the continued use of  the masculine rule  (Dreidger, 1976; Ritchie, 1977, 1975). 
 These were debates about law, English, grammar, and the oppression of  women. At the 
same time, however, critical legal scholars were turning to the power of  legal language itself. In 
the late 1980s, Karen Busby argued that because of  the unique power of  language to construct 
reality, and because of  its close connections with ideology, it was particularly necessary to trace 
the means by which legal language excludes and devalues women (Busby, 1989). As Busby put it, 
her task was to examine the idea that: ‘grammatical features of the legal register such as 
pronouns, generics, lexicon, semantics and syntax trivialize, exclude and devalue women and 
characteristics associated with women’ (Busby, 1989, p. 192). She stated that analysing the 
language of  legal text allowed a picture to emerge of  its ‘preconstructions and preferred 
meanings’ that would allow better understanding of  what law has emerged, with what 
implications for women (Busby, 1989, p. 192). Drawing on the feminist theorist Mary Daly, 
Busby noted that legal language was in effect a ‘contaminated language’, which had been 
constructed along androcentric lines. This was a particular problem because of  the tendency of  
law to place emphasis on legal signifiers or words, thereby creating a gendering symbolism that 
enacted exclusionary norms whilst simultaneously instantiating these norms as law through legal 
language in textual form. As Wendy Martyna put it, the widespread opposition that feminists 
faced in drawing attention to gendered and sexist terms was not merely due to antifeminism, but 
also perhaps to a cultural resistance against recognising the power of  language itself: ‘We may 
still be in the midst of  a cultural reaction against early preoccupation with the magical power of  
words’ (Martyna, 1980, p. 492). 
Many feminists at the time, and since, have understood the ‘magical power of  words’ to 
go far beyond legal texts, encompassing a range of  social and cultural expression. For feminist 






legal activists and academics in the 1960s and 1970s, the sheer power of  language to shape and 
enact social norms when mobilised through law demanded a strategy that would intervene into 
legal text and expression, conjuring otherwise the magic of  androcentric legal expression by 
bringing back in the neglected sex/gender. The results of  these feminist interventions are 
inherently difficult to trace, leaving feminists curious about the social effects of  language: 
… the more interesting question for me is, has it really changed? Has language really 
changed the way people actually act? I don't know the answer to that. I do know that 
women have more opportunities than they had than when I started out. (Interview with 
Margaret Wilson, former New Zealand Minister with responsibility for legislative 
drafting, 2019) 
Yet the power of  gendering language is now widely accepted within professional communities of  
legislative drafters. As the influential text Thornton’s Legislative Drafting puts it: ‘the enactment of  
legislation in ‘masculine’ language contributes to the perpetuation of  a male-oriented society in 
which women are seen as having a lower status and value’ (Xanthaki, 2013, p. 80).  
 
Reforming “He or She” 
Reintroducing the feminine into statutory text has not been easy. An obvious target might be 
interpretation legislation itself. Petersson identifies four potential reforms to the ‘masculine rule,’ 
for example: the two-way rule, the all-gender rule, the separate gender rule, and the removal of  
the masculine rule altogether (Petersson, 1999, p. 36). The two-way rule is particularly interesting. 
It provides for words importing the masculine and the feminine to be read as each including the 
other. It was initially used in Canada between 1837 and 1840 and much later adopted in the UK 
in section 6 of  the Interpretation Act 1978: 
 In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears, - 
(a) words importing the masculine gender include the feminine; 






(b) words importing the feminine gender include the masculine; 
(c) words in the singular include the plural and words in the plural include the singular. 
The rule is still in force. The ‘vice versa’ nature of  the rule appears to bestow a certain form of  
binary equality between two genders – masculine and feminine. Petersson’s criticism of  the rule 
is that it is merely to be used in reading, rather than in writing, legislation, and so does not 
necessarily require a change to drafting practice.10  The formal structure of  the rule is an issue 
for Petersson because it promotes ‘false neutrality’, retaining the masculine rule despite appearing 
to be balanced. The rule sets up an unhelpful equivalence between gender and number, running 
alongside and paralleling the number rule at section 6(c) (see above). As Petersson puts it: 
In adopting the same structure, the two-way rule aspires to the neutrality of  the number 
rule. However, the number rule is neutral because number is not socially significant. 
Therefore any comparison between the number rule and the two-way rule is false 
because gender is socially significant … (Petersson, 1999, p. 41) 
Not only that, but the structure of  the two-way rule preserves the integrity of  the masculine rule 
by playing it first and having the feminine rule in a subsequent section (Petersson, 1999, p. 42). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the two-way rule seems to have little effect in ‘real life’ on 
how people perceive gender equivalence. 
In interviews, drafters referred to the rule’s self-recursivity through equivalence whereby 
one gender was to be treated ‘as’ the other. This was felt not to recognise wider social dilemmas 
about very real gender inequalities. Helen Xanthaki, Professor of  Law and Legislative Drafting at 
UCL, explained the reasons for this in an interview in 2019. She described a performative 
                                                                
10 Yet this does not mean that drafters have not been, and are not, influenced by such rules. As interview 
participants stated above, the masculine rule itself  is taken to have driven the way that drafters approached legislative 
expression of  gender from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Furthermore, Margaret Wilson recalls from her 
experience in the New Zealand context that it was ‘difficult to get policy makers and drafters to understand that the 
male pronoun did not include women’ (Wilson, 2011, p. 205). 






experiment she uses in teaching, in which she encourages students to stand up in line with the 
proposition that “she includes he”: 
I simply say to everybody okay, so in this class the following rule applies. “She includes 
he.” Ladies, would you stand up? I still have not had a single male standing up on that 
basis. Nobody, no man stands up if I say “she includes he”. (Interview with Helen 
Xanthaki, 2019) 
If  feminists have been looking for a type of  interpretation rule that effectively re-includes 
women, the two-way rule has not reached this objective. In this way, far from merely writing 
statutes to government directions about the substance of  legislation, therefore, legislative 
drafters have to resolve intense on-going dilemmas about how to adjust legislative expression to 
current and future sex/gender norms. 
 
“Waving a Wand” 
These deliberations are relevant not only for gender-neutral drafting techniques more broadly, 
which are addressed in the following section, but also because they intersect with debates about 
the structure and use of  interpretation legislation. Given the problems outlined with the two-way 
rule, it is clear that interpretation legislation is legally significant and has practical and symbolic 
importance within debates about legislation, attracting critique when not sufficiently inclusive or 
precise and also sometimes appearing to offer solutions to new social expressions of  sex/gender. 
In an interview, for example, this drafter suggested a mechanism whereby interpretation 
legislation could be amended to provide that reference to one gender includes reference to any 
gender or people not of  that gender: 
One way of recognising another gender or no gender would be to amend the 
Interpretation Act. You could have this as part of any general recognition of change or 
decision to do away with recording of genders, or whatever else there might be. The 






Interpretation Act at the moment refers to the masculine and the feminine and vice 
versa, for things post 1979.  And it would be possible to say something like: “any 
reference to a person of one gender includes a reference to a person of any gender or a 
person who is not of any gender”. (Interview with legislative drafter, 2019) 
I return below to the question of  using interpretation legislation in relation to the decertification 
of  gender. In the meantime, the drafter’s suggestion appears to offer an elegant solution to the 
structural inequalities found in the ‘vice versa’ or ‘two-way’ rule currently in force in the UK. It is 
worth noting that the solution is similar (but not identical) to what Petersson has identified as the 
‘all-gender rule’, which was adopted in the Australian Commonwealth in 1984: 
 In any Act, unless the contrary appears – 
 (a) words importing a gender include every other gender.11 
Similarly, the gender interpretation rule in the New Zealand Interpretation Bill 2017 states: 
 16. References to specific gender or kind of  person include others 
 (1) Words denoting a gender include every other gender. 
The difference between what my legislative drafting informant suggested and the examples from 
Australia and New Zealand is the addition of  the words “or who is not of  that gender”, thereby 
including not just non-binary individuals, but also individuals who do not identify as any gender. 
An analogous approach can be found in the Legislation (Wales) Act 2019, which aims to 
consolidate and eventually codify Welsh law (Welsh Government, 2018, p.11), and which 
contains a broad provision explicitly allowing for the non-binary, even plural, gender 
interpretation of  legislation: 
 Section 8: Words denoting a gender are not limited to that gender 
In an Assembly Act or a Welsh subordinate instrument, words denoting persons of  a 
particular gender are not to be read as limited to persons of  that gender. 
                                                                
11 Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 1984 (Cth) no 27 s 11; see Petersson (1999, p. 43). 






This provision expressly goes beyond the two-way interpretation rule in the UK’s Interpretation 
Act 1978. As the explanatory notes to the 2019 Act put it:  
This section is equivalent to section 6(a) and (b) of  the 1978 Act, but it does not refer 
expressly to the male and female genders and therefore has a wider scope. (emphasis 
added) 
The explanatory notes point out that the rule is limited by context in a similar way as other 
interpretation legislation; that is, if  ‘express provision is made to the contrary or the context 
requires otherwise’ then it will not apply.12 This means that if  a policy area requires specific 
application to one gender, then the rule will not override interpretation of  legislation along those 
lines.  
 In explicitly going far beyond the current interpretation rule in the 1978 Act, the Welsh 
provision raises intriguing questions about why such innovation has been possible in a devolved 
assembly and not at Westminster. Christopher Williams proposes that this may be in part due to 
the Welsh Assembly legislating in two languages (Williams, 2008, p. 152). Welsh legislative 
drafters face particular challenges when drafting gender-related provisions across English and 
Welsh with their very different approaches to gender (see further below). Such dilemmas, with 
their associated potential for innovation, are a feature of  any jurisdiction encompassing more 
than one language system and often accompany attempts (however effective they might be, or 
not) to devolve power or recognise plural legal systems within postcolonial legal contexts, often 
with associated language implications. For example, as King and Fawcett point out, the te reo 
Māori word ia is a gender neutral pronoun and can mean ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘him’, ‘it’ or ‘they’ (King and 
Fawcett, 2018, p. 113). Ia is used through the Te Ture mō Te Reo Māori 2016/the Māori 
Language Act 2016 in New Zealand. In this way, dilemmas of addressing the masculine rule 
within interpretation legislation have distinct valences depending on colonial and linguistic 
                                                                
12 Section 71, Explanatory Notes to the Legislation (Wales) Act 2019. 






context. Given the spread of interpretation acts with their associated masculine rules (and 
variations thereof) throughout jurisdictions colonised by the British (Petersson, 1999), and given 
changing developments in the legal recognition of diverse political and cultural constituencies, 
diverse legal solutions are likely to be forged as the continued use of interpretation legislation 
meets distinct gender ontologies with their associated terms and expressions. 
 A final point to consider when we think about the sort of ‘meta’ solutions to legal 
problems that interpretation acts seem to offer is the matter of retrospectively altering or 
removing gender terms across the legislative field as a whole. As this legislative drafter put it, 
because this would be ‘a lot more work’, people might accept statutes as they have been 
historically gendered on the basis that future legislation would look very different:  
… in terms of a societal solution of saying “we don't like the fact that there is gender in 
the existing statute book”, that’s obviously a lot more work if you wanted to solve that 
rather than simply making a change in future Acts. Maybe people could live with it on 
the basis that it's part of the history or something and that the future doesn't look the 
same. It already doesn't look the same because of our move away from gender-specific 
drafting. (Interview with legislative drafter, 2019) 
This is based on an assumption that as drafting techniques, government policies, and social 
norms change, anachronistic sex/gender expressions will eventually fall away. As such, the idea 
of using legislative drafting techniques to incrementally alter the statute book over time displays 
faith in the ‘drafter’s toolbox’ and ultimately in the potential for drafting to respond to its social 
context. Margaret Wilson juxtaposes the incrementalism of using a ‘toolbox’ with the immediate 
wholesale transformation of ‘waving a wand’ in her discussion of New Zealand’s approach to 
legislative reform: 
You can't go through easily your whole legislative programme, particularly when you pass 
so many laws and make them gender neutral. The idea was, each time they came up for 






renewal or you had new and then you should actually have this as the norm in the 
toolbox of the drafter. If it is in the drafter’s toolbox, and it is actually seen as part of 
what they do, then you are part way there or mainly there, unless there is then another 
political reaction and their toolbox has changed politically or there is a movement within 
the legal drafting community … At the end of the day, it would have been lovely to have waved 
a wand. (Interview 2019; emphasis added) 
 “Waving a wand” therefore references a tension between approaching statutes 
individually, bringing to bear new gender-related drafting techniques as they arise, and 
approaching the reform of  legislative expression in a more universal and holistic fashion. 
However, both the toolbox and the wand metaphors evoke the idea of  a body of  legislation – 
termed ‘the statute book’ by drafters and lawyers - which can be conceptualised in totality, as a 
‘whole’. The New Zealand Chief  Parliamentary Counsel is empowered by New Zealand’s 
Legislation Act 2012 to make certain editorial changes to the text of  legislation when re-printing 
it, including changing gender-specific language to gender-neutral language.13 Is this using a 
toolbox or waving a wand? In all drafting contexts, however it is conceptualised, the role of  the 
drafter as the technician, or wand-bearer, is central to continued efforts towards intervening into 
the ‘magic’ of  gendered legal terms. Yet the conceptual pull of  ‘statute book’ is significant: 
drafters tend to feel that measures should not be taken that create undue distortions or 
inconsistencies across the body of  legislation as a whole (e.g. Grabham, 2016). Such 
considerations inevitably bear on any attempts to propose new forms of  gender expression in 
                                                                
13 See section 25(1)(a) Legislation Act 2012:  
The Chief Parliamentary Counsel may make the following changes in a reprint: 
(a) language that indicates or could be taken to indicate a particular gender may be changed to gender-neutral 
language so that it is consistent with current drafting practice, as long as it is also consistent with the purpose of the 
legislation being reprinted: 
Examples 
The word “he” may be changed to “he or she”, or replaced with the relevant noun. 
The word “chairman” may be changed to “chairperson”. 
The words “Her Majesty the Queen” may be changed to “the Sovereign”. 
 






statutes. With this in mind, the next section turns to the multiple techniques and concepts 
relating to gender-neutral drafting that are used, debated, and contested within UK drafting 
practice at present. 
 
Nothing But the Words? 
 
…there are many ways for the drafter to achieve gender-neutrality when drafting. 
Although the policy maker may give the direction for gender-neutral text, it is the drafter 
who has the responsibility of making it happen. (Wilson, 2011, p. 207) 
 
In their survey of gender-neutral drafting in New Zealand and internationally, Ruby King and 
Jasper Fawcett state that ‘there seems to be an attitude among law-makers in the United 
Kingdom of prioritizing traditional grammar over gender-neutral language’ (King and Fawcett, 
2018, p. 123). Whilst the UK is not considered to be at the forefront of innovation in this area, 
the situation may be more complex than King and Fawcett’s observation suggests. In a House of 
Lords debate on the issue in 2013, Lord Kennedy of Southwark wryly acknowledged that the 
UK was not at the forefront of innovation: ‘You could say that we have not been quick off the 
starting blocks here’.14 Yet UK drafters are aware of shifts in social norms and actively engaged 
in discussions about when and how to respond. Gender-neutral drafting has been UK 
government policy since 2007 when it was announced by the then leader of the House of 
Commons Jack Straw. Straw stated that using male pronouns to refer to men and women was 
believed to ‘reinforce historic gender stereotypes’ and that it presented an ‘obstacle to clearer 
understanding for those unfamiliar with the convention’.15 Without explaining what gender 
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neutral drafting entailed exactly, Straw then stated that Government Bills would ‘take a form 
which achieves gender neutral drafting so far as it is practicable, at no more than a reasonable 
cost to brevity or intelligibility’ and that legislative drafters would need to ‘adopt a flexible 
approach to this change’.16 He pointed out that the policy already applied in relation to tax law 
rewrite bills. 
 Interviews with UK legislative drafters and experts indicate a ‘very high premium placed 
on freedom’, which allows drafters to solve problems independently whilst also deliberating their 
practice with colleagues on an on-going basis.17 Drafting is thus understood as something akin to 
both skill and art, resulting in work that is based on universal principles, yet specific to the 
drafter and to the instructions they get from the relevant government department (Bowman, 
2015). As this legislative drafting expert put it: 
I actually don’t think that two people could come up with the same draft. I don’t think 
it’s possible. I think there is so much subjectivity in drafting and again, that’s a good 
thing. (Interview, 2019) 
Nevertheless, innovations inevitably bring with them some kind of conversation about what is, 
and should be, ‘standard’. When I asked about how the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 
(OPC) responded internally to the 2007 House of Commons statement, drafters responded that 
it was not ‘uniformly liked or disliked’ but that there were debates in the OPC about the extent 
to which gender-neutral drafting techniques would affect clarity: 
There was a mixture of views. Some people thought that it would make our drafting less 
easy to understand and less clear. Other people supported it and didn’t think it would 
particularly damage the clarity of the drafting. (Interview, 2019) 
After the 2007 statement, attention turned to developing techniques to achieve gender neutrality. 
                                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Interview with legislative drafter, 2019. 






Another common theme in interviews with drafters and legislative drafting experts is that efforts 
to draft in gender-neutral ways are often understood as resulting in improvements to drafting 
overall due to the dexterity and intense attention to the drafting process that this new approach 
requires: 
… one of the things that I found surprising was how often trying to rephrase it to avoid 
the issue, we ended up with a much better draft in any event than we could have got to in 
the first place. It sort of prompted us to rethink the way we were drafting more generally. 
(Interview with legislative drafter, 2019; see also Wilson, 2011, pp. 206–207) 
 In any case, the emerging techniques have made their way into the OPC’s Drafting 
Guidance, the most recent version of which is dated July 2018. The guidance states that it is 
OPC practice to draft in a gender-neutral style ‘so far as it is practicable to do so’, following the 
wording of the 2007 ministerial statement. Gender neutrality is thus a provisional goal. 
Importantly, the OPC notes that gender-neutral drafting applies both to drafting freestanding 
text in a new Bill and also to drafting text that will amend an older Act that is not gender neutral 
(OPC, 2018, p.7). And once again, gender neutrality is not defined outside efforts towards its 
technical achievement, which is expressed in the guidance in terms of avoidance rather than 
positive suggestion: 
 What does gender-neutral drafting require?  
2.1.3  In practice, gender-neutral drafting means two things—  
• avoiding gender-specific pronouns (such as “he”) for a person who is not 
necessarily of that gender;  
• avoiding nouns that might appear to assume that a person of a particular 
gender will do a particular job or perform a particular role (eg 
“chairman”). (OPC, 2018, p.7)  
The guidance then sets out three categories of techniques for avoiding gender-specific pronouns: 






(1) repeat the noun; (2) change the pronoun; (3) rephrase to avoid the need for a pronoun or 
noun (OPC, 2018, p.7). Similar techniques are used in jurisdictions across the Commonwealth to 
varying degrees, and difficulties and controversies attach to each. In the remainder of this 
section, I address the first two categories, leaving an assessment of the final category (rephrasing 
to avoid the need for a pronoun) for future consideration.  
 The first technique for achieving gender neutrality, therefore, is repeating the noun. The 
OPC gives the following example: 
EXAMPLE ...earnings, in relation to a person, means sums payable to the person in 
connection with the person’s employment... (OPC, 2018, p.8) 
 This technique is widely used and advocated (see, e.g. Salembier, 2015; Xanthaki, 2013), yet it 
has a couple of acknowledged drawbacks. Thornton’s Legislative Drafting succinctly states that it 
‘creates verbosity’ (Xanthaki, 2013, p. 81). The OPC goes into more detail, explaining that 
‘(c)onstant repetition of a noun or phrase in a way which would not occur in speech can jar and 
might detract from readability’ (OPC, 2018, p.8). As such, the OPC proposes slight variations, 
including using a defined term – for example “the offender” – or replacing the noun with a 
letter. Using a letter is stated not to reflect English usage and the OPC also notes that it creates a 
‘mental hoop’ for the reader to go through, which decreases readability and means that the 
technique should only be used ‘judiciously’ (OPC, 2018, p.8). For this feminist legal academic, 
the problem with using a letter instead of a pronoun is that it might create false equivalences or 
otherwise decontextualize the social harm or phenomenon that the legislation targets, creating a 
bar to interpretation: 
It tries to turn it into a maths problem. It is like the old maths problem with humans 
thing. It completely decontextualises the whole issue. So because A and B are equivalent, 
A and B just happened, it removes the whole context. It is not an aid to interpretation, 
it's a bar to interpretation, because if some judge comes along and thinks “What is all this 






about? I don't get it” then they can continue to be ignorant of it, because there is nothing 
that tells them what the actual social problem is that this thing is trying to address. 
(Interview with feminist legal academic, 2019) 
Whilst the technique was previously used quite widely in gender-neutral drafting, possibly being 
seen as a solution of sorts, it has now waned as drafters have re-considered its effectiveness:  
The more old-fashioned approach was sometimes to use “the first mentioned person”, 
“the second mentioned person” and your head starts to spin, especially if they’re 
mentioned quite a few times. In that case, we might still use letters. But there was a time 
when I think people were using letters, for example “P's” rather than “his”, to make 
drafts gender-neutral … I think that we would now say “we tried that and it didn't 
work”. We are not sure that is the best way of doing it. (Interview with legislative 
drafters, 2019) 
As such, the situation now seems to be that letters may be used instead of pronouns in some 
situations to avoid repetition, but otherwise drafters do not consider it to be ‘the best way of’ 
achieving gender neutral drafting. 
 The second technique of gender-neutral drafting – changing the pronoun – brings with it 
much more potential controversy than repeating the noun. There are two main debates here: the 
familiar conversation about “he or she”; and an intense ongoing controversy about the use of the 
singular “they”. Beyond stating that ‘frequent use of “he or she” … can be awkward’, the OPC 
guidance remains silent on the genesis of the “he or she” construction and its current reception 
within drafting circles. As we have seen, discussions about using “he or she” reference both its 
continued necessity and the risk of  creating obsolescence. King and Fawcett support these views, 
noting a shift away even from the ‘dual-gendered language’ that was seen as an improvement on 
the widespread use of  ‘he’ (King and Fawcett, 2018, p. 111). They argue that despite being more 
inclusive than the masculine rule, “he or she” wording currently still in use in New Zealand, for 






example, does not recognise people outside the binary, and is perceived to ‘pigeonhole gender 
into two categories’ (King and Fawcett, 2018, p. 111). Within international conversations about 
legislative drafting, therefore, it seems that “he or she” is losing currency.  
 This assessment of  the direction of  “he or she” is shared by legislative drafters, who 
consider its use not to be at the forefront of  current practice: 
In the guidance, we still do mention that one of the techniques you can use is “he or 
she”. That's the one that isn't necessarily as gender-inclusive. We’ve examined it quite 
recently. There was a lively discussion … and different views were expressed on it. We 
reached the conclusion that we hadn't yet got to the point generally in society where “he 
or she” is regarded as an unusual way of expressing things. (Interview with legislative 
drafters, 2019) 
Drafters’ preoccupation with drafting to current social norms prevents them from adopting 
techniques that might be viewed as overly challenging of  binary views of  sex and gender. 
However, drafters appear to believe that as social norms and experiences change, it may be 
necessary in the future to draft for non-binary legal subjects, or for other genders, and hence do 
not perceive “he or she” as being useful in the long-term: 
 
There would have been a time when I might have thought, if I’m just talking about 
natural people, “he or she” or she is quite handy and I don't have to create contortions 
around restructuring my words, especially if it’s “his or her” something or other. But 
now I think, well, hold on a second, I can see that there must be a time when there is a 
possibility, to put it no higher than that, that there will be some other gender or non-
gender, whether it's within the UK or abroad. And therefore, from my perspective, I 
think … there will have to be a technical solution if that happens. (Interview with 
legislative drafters, 2019) 
 






These views extend to technical concern that using “he or she” might at some future point 
actively create anachronism or obsolescence within legislation: 
… from a personal position, I wouldn't use “he or she” just because I think I am 
building in obsolescence into the statute book. (Interview with legislative drafters, 2019) 
 Another option for ‘changing the pronoun’, of  course, is using the singular “they”. This 
technique has already been adopted in Canada, Australia, South Africa, Hong Kong and the 
province of  Ontario (King and Fawcett, 2018; Revell et al., 1994; Salembier, 2015). Canadian 
federal legislative drafting guidance, for example, positions the use of  the singular “they” as the 
first of  a number of  techniques for avoiding gender-specific nouns: 
1. use the singular “they” and its other grammatical forms (“them”, “themselves” and 
“their”) to refer to indefinite pronouns and singular nouns. (Government of  Canada 
Department of  Justice, 2015) 
The OPC’s drafting guidelines on this technique recognise that “they” is used in common 
parlance to refer to a person of  either sex in the singular, but also acknowledge that this usage is 
contested: 
 2.1.16 They (singular). In common parlance, “they” is often used in relation to a 
singular antecedent which could refer to a person of  either sex. 
 2.1.17 Whether this popular usage is correct or not is perhaps a matter of  dispute. 
OED (2nd ed, 1989) records the usage without comment; SOED (5th ed, 2002) notes 
“considered erron. by some”. It is certainly well-precedented in respectable literature 
over several centuries. In the debate on gender-neutral drafting in the House of  Lords in 
2013 a number of  peers expressed concern about the use of  “they” as a singular 
pronoun. 
2.1.18 It may be that “they” as a singular pronoun seems more natural in some contexts 
(for example, where the antecedent is “any person” or “a person”) than in others. (OPC 






2018, 8-9, references omitted) 
In fact, the singular “they” has now been debated twice in Parliament, in 2013 and in 2018, 
evidencing gradually decreasing hostility towards the construction. In December 2013, Lord 
Scott of  Foscote submitted a question for short debate in the House of  Lords asking the 
government ‘what guidance they issue to Parliamentary Counsel with regard to the use of  
gender-neutral language in the drafting of  legislation’.18 Having introduced the context of  the 
2007 ministerial statement and section 6 of  the Interpretation Act 1978, Lord Scott then largely 
turned his attention to the use of  the singular “they” in legislative drafting practice, outlining a 
number of  examples from primary and secondary legislation and explanatory memoranda, and 
describing them as ‘grammatically inappropriate plural pronouns coupled with references to a 
single person’.19 Arguing that primary and secondary legislation should serve as models for the 
‘correct use of  the English language’, he then asserted that ‘(t)o prostitute the English language 
in pursuit of  some goal of  gender equality is, I suggest, unacceptable’.20 He further argued that 
using the singular “they” was unnecessary in light of  section 6 Interpretation Act 1978.  
 Lord Scott’s speech was followed by a short intervention by Lord Quirk, notable in light 
of  his long academic career as an internationally renowned linguist and the originator and for 
many years director of  the first international Survey of  English Usage at University College 
London. Lord Quirk’s Grammar of  Contemporary English (1972, with Geoffrey Leech and Jan 
Svartvik) and Comprehensive Grammar of  the English Language (1985, with Leech and Svartvik) were 
standard setting reference grammars in modern English for many years and he trained or helped 
train many specialists now working in the fields of  linguistics and corpus linguistics. Lord Quirk 
did not directly criticise the use of  the singular “they” in legislation. Instead, he framed this 
technique as originating in an essential grammatical lack in English for which either of  two 
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fudges were often used: the singular “they”, on the one hand, and the universal “he”, on the 
other: 
… in grammar, like many other languages, English lacks an epicene third person 
pronoun that can have anaphoric reference to an ungendered antecedent – that is putting 
it in plain language. For literally hundreds of years, we have vacillated between solutions 
that partly fit the bill, especially “he”, which is third person and singular but not, of 
course, epicene, and “they”, which is third person and epicene but not, of course, 
singular.21 
Lord Quirk’s intervention put the use of  the singular “they” on equivalent footing to the use of  
the universal “he”, positioning the latter as just as much of  a problem, grammatically, as the 
former. He managed to acknowledge his colleagues’ fear of  “they” ‘creeping into legislation’ 
whilst also performing the equivalent of  a polite linguist’s shrug of  the shoulders: what can you 
do if  you lack the grammatical tools? And his reference to the practice of  using the singular 
“they” as having existed over ‘hundreds of  years’ positioned drafters’ use of  the technique 
within a much longer time frame than possibly understood by Lord Scott and others. Lord Quirk 
finished his remarks by directly critiquing section 6 of  the Interpretation Act on the basis that 
deeming the masculine to include the feminine had been shown by ‘convincing psycholinguistic 
experiments’ to create images of  men as the legal subjects.22 During the remainder of  the debate, 
Lord Kennedy of  Southwark referred to the evolution of  the English language which, he 
asserted, ‘is not a stand-alone, stand-still language,’ but which is ‘developing and shaping us into 
who we are today’.23 Finally, Lord Gardiner of  Kimble, in formally responding to the question, 
acknowledged the risks of  using the singular “they” but stated that it ‘reflects common usage … 
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and is well precedented in literature over the centuries’.24 
 The 2013 debate did enough to raise concerns about the use of  gender-neutral drafting 
techniques such as the singular “they” but never had the scope to settle any of  these concerns. 
Essentially, the debate seems to have spooked drafters in the OPC, leading to the insertion of  
wording into the 2014 version of  the OPC Drafting Guidance recommending its avoidance.25 
Yet drafters seem to be continuously assessing the use of  this construction, to the extent that by 
the time of  a later debate in 2018, drafters had already re-assessed the use of  the singular “they”: 
… there was the political context. We were … gently encouraging people not to the 
singular “they” because of debates in the House of Lords. Then we reviewed it again 
more recently and thought that things had moved on. In the more recent debate, which 
came shortly after we changed our guidance, but wasn't linked to our guidance, I don't 
think anybody objected to the use of the singular “they” on grammatical grounds. 
(Interview with legislative drafters, 2019) 
The 2018 debate centred much more explicitly from the outset on the use of  the singular “they” 
but evidenced a qualitatively different attitude to the issue amongst peers. Notably, this debate 
took place shortly before the launch of  a consultation on the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and 
just after the national LGBT survey, which received over 108,000 responses, of  which 6.9% were 
from non-binary people, 3.5% were from trans women, 2.9% were from trans men, and 2% were 
from intersex people (see further Government Equalities Office, 2019). Lord Lucas asked the 
Government whether they would  ‘adopt the use of  “they” as the singular pronoun in all future 
legislation in preference to gendered pronouns’.26 He described the OPC drafting guidance as a 
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“halfway house” and asked whether the ‘whole aspect of  gender in legislation and public 
practice’ should not be reviewed given the upcoming review of  the Gender Recognition Act.27 
Baroness Lister of  Burtersett shortly after followed up on the point, asking why using the 
singular “they” would be a ‘step too far’.28 Lord Young of  Cookham replied that it had been 
used but that to require it in every case would deprive legislative drafters of  flexibility. Baroness 
Barker then followed up with a question directly relating to trans people’s use of  pronouns: 
My Lord, trans activists who I know very well do not wish to stop anybody using gender 
pronouns; they simply wish to add more ways in which people can use terms that 
describe them more accurately. Private sector companies are way ahead and are latching 
onto this.29 
Lord Young replied that he hoped that the consultation on the Gender Recognition Act and the 
LGBT survey would reassure her that the Government took the issue seriously, even though 
neither of  these addressed the matter of  legislative drafting, as such.30 Following the 2018 
debate, the OPC guidance which formerly recommended avoiding the singular “they” was 
changed to merely assert that it may be more ‘more natural in some contexts rather than in 
others’ (OPC, 2018, p.9). 
 Amongst legislative drafters, drafting experts, and legal scholars, diverse views on the 
singular “they” remain. The Canadian academic and drafter Paul Salembier, for example, asserts 
that the use of  the singular “they” is grammatically incorrect, that it impedes comprehension by 
introducing subject-verb mismatches, and that it introduces ‘the potential for syntactic ambiguity’ 
resulting in a legislative text with two or more meanings, only one of  which can be correct 
(Salembier, 2015, p. 178). On the other hand, the Australian drafter James Dalmau argues 
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strongly in favour of  an open approach to issues of  ‘contested usage’, such as the use of  the 
singular “they”. He points out that the expertise of  legislative counsel derives in large part from 
a large repertoire of  techniques that drafters develop and practice. As he puts it, ‘denying 
recourse to a contested usage reduces this repertoire’ (Dalmau, 2019, p. 28). King and Fawcett 
note that language is organic, and that considering of  shifting language norms should inform the 
reception of  techniques such as the singular “they” (King and Fawcett, 2018, p. 114). Indeed, the 
singular “they” is endorsed by Thornton’s Legislative Drafting on the basis that ‘grammar is 
simply a tool and not a chain’: 
Although this technique has not been fully accepted, it is gaining ground rapidly … What 
seems to annoy most opponents to the technique is the grammatical error in its 
expressions … But is grammatical correctness that important? Since grammar is simply a 
tool, and not a chain, in the hands of  drafters, gender neutrality cannot continue to 
remain anchored down by the inherent limitations of  language. (Xanthaki, 2013, p. 82) 
The use of the singular “they”, therefore, evidences an approach to legislative drafting which is 
not “anchored down” by the limitations of language. In a similar vein, feminist legal scholar 
Rosemary Hunter notes the flexibility of “they” in responding to changing social context and the 
specific circumstances of each legal situation: 
… “they” is a travelling concept. It can run the characteristics that are relevant at the 
particular time. (Interview, 2019) 
And as she put it, “they” is widely understood in public as referring to each gender. A similar 
breadth of opinion seems to be reflected within the OPC, where views range from those who 
find the construction to be ungrammatical to those who consider there to be a movement in 
favour of its more widespread adoption: 
Within the Office, views are divided. I find that the use of the singular “they” grates at 
the moment. I would probably use it in a letter, but not in a draft. … I suppose that our 






discussion within the Office of “they” reflects what is going on in society more widely. 
(I)f all the newspapers and most people start using the singular “they” in writing, I think 
that it will become second nature even if it once felt wrong grammatically. (Interview 
with legislative drafters, 2019) 
 A further potential option for ‘changing the pronoun’ is through using terms such as 
“ze” to replace “her/his” and “he/she”. Such terms have become more widespread in 
educational and political organising contexts, for example, to avoid mis-gendering people and to 
acknowledge the need for gender-neutral pronouns (Dembroff and Wodak, 2018). Indeed, 
successive generations of drafters seem to display less surprise at gender neutral drafting and 
more awareness of new evolving pronouns, as this drafter suggested: 
When we get a new batch of recruits we sit down and talk about the drafting guidance 
and I mention the chapter on gender-neutrality, we get some quite blank faces, because 
it's just not an issue … The discussion normally then turns to non-binary issues and have 
we considered using “ze” or other things like that. (Interview with legislative drafters, 
2019) 
However, when asked whether the OPC would consider using terms such as “ze”, the reply was 
in line with the OPC’s approach of reflecting standard English usage but trying to avoid 
innovating beyond current social norms: 
I think “ze” isn’t standard English usage, so that would be one of the reasons. That’s 
why we wouldn't use it at the moment. Gender-neutral drafting is an area that we keep 
revisiting and talking and thinking about. (Interview with legislative drafters, 2019) 
 Yet terms such as “ze” might come into use in legislative drafting if new proposals for 
‘gender inclusive’ and ‘gender-silent’ drafting take hold. Helen Xanthaki has written about the 
conceptual potential of ‘gender inclusive’ drafting, encouraging an approach in which ‘the subject 
does not need to identify as one of the two genders: they can see themselves as any or none or 






anything in between’ (Xanthaki, 2019). Xanthaki strongly endorses the use of the singular “they” 
within the gender inclusive approach, recognizing that ‘everyone, not just men and women, is 
equal before the eyes of the law’ (Xanthaki, 2019), and thereby clearing a path for recognising a 
wider range of genders. She views the singular “they” as grammatically controversial, yet she 
argues that its adoption within drafting practice is ideal in eliminating gender as a relevant factor 
in legislation. As Xanthaki put it during an interview: 
My personal view is, no, we need to be brave. This is a problem in our society and it's a 
problem generally, for me. It's unacceptable that we exclude people because they are not 
of a specific gender at that specific moment in time. For me, it needs to be dealt across 
the board. If this is considered to be too much, okay, experimental legislation has 
happened before. It's not a novel thing. (Interview, 2019) 
In a similar vein, Donald Revell and Jessica Vapnek have recently advocated for the 
‘gender silent’ approach, which is explicitly oriented at reflecting and supporting the rights of 
transgender and non-binary individuals (Revell and Vapnek, 2020). Based on an extensive 
summary, internationally, of drafting in English speaking countries, Revell and Vapnek argue for 
an increased recognition by drafters that ‘gender and sexual identities exist along a continuum’ 
(Revell and Vapnek, 2020, p. 105). They note that many jurisdictions are moving towards such 
an approach through the use of techniques already addressed above, for example, repeating the 
noun or using the singular “they”. As they put it, such an approach is ‘not a fad: it reflects the 
fact that society is changing’ (Revell and Vapnek, 2020, p. 145). 
What emerges from this debate is a set of evolving drafting techniques that drafters use, 
re-assess, and drop or alter, depending on whether they work well and on wider legal, and 
particularly Parliamentary, debate. Drafters described coming up with an initial set of practices 
after the 2007 government statement, some of which became over-used when drafters started 
adopting them in other contexts. The overall impression is that drafting practice is alive with 






controversies of ‘contested usage’ (Dalmau 2019) and fosters ‘technical pluralism’ (Grabham, 
2016) through which multiple techniques are adopted, developed, and phased out (if necessary) 
over a field of legislation. As indicated, each of these techniques is associated with a slightly 
different political ontology of sex/gender. That these very different orders of thinking about 
sex/gender attach to distinct drafting techniques provides fascinating material for the project’s 
ongoing work on statutory law. 
 
 
Balls, Bones, and Grenades 
 
 
In preparation for this debate, I asked myself: what is the English language? (Lord 
Kennedy of Southwark, HL Deb 12 Dec 2013, col 1010) 
 
.. the question is are the drafters communicating or are they simply passing on others’ 
attempts to communicate? (Stefanou, 2015, p. 4) 
  
What does the drafting feel like? The drafting feels like juggling a number of different 
balls in the air, I suppose if you want an overused metaphor [laughs]. And they are not all 
balls. Some of them are bones. Some of them are grenades. (Feminist legal scholar, 2019) 
 
This article has charted longstanding and more recent debates in legislative drafting about the 
expression of  sex/gender in order to provide a basis for the project’s future work on an 
experimental statute decertifying gender in law. With that in mind, the Future of  Legal Gender 
project has two main sets of  questions to consider in relation to legislative drafting. The first is 
how to achieve decertification in an experimental statute – how to draft the statute, what 
principles and sources to use, how to make it as potentially effective as it would need to be. This 






is as much an aspirational question as it is a technical dilemma and our ongoing work engages 
with legislative drafters and feminist activists, policy-makers and scholars to further explore it. In 
terms of  substance, the experimental statute will target specific areas where the gender assigned 
at birth is used for identification or other legal reasons throughout the life course and where 
raise particular questions of  opportunity, note of  caution in the context of  feminist politics 
(Cooper and Emerton, this issue; Peel and Newman, this issue). Our ongoing work in this area 
focuses intensely on the gendered character of dominant social systems, how law upholds these 
systems, and the potential benefits and disadvantages of unpicking legal gender status through 
decertification. This special issue has canvassed certain of  these substantive concerns, for 
example relating to same sex provision (e.g. Renz, this issue) and future publications, including in 
relation to the experimental statute itself, will further explore these issues.  
 In terms of  drafting, however, we have a number of  potential concerns, routes, 
dilemmas, and solutions. For example, we might consider using interpretation statutes to support 
the decertification of  gender: changing the text of  the interpretation statute so as to support a 
reading of  all legislation that dis-attaches legal gender from the subject or which references 
decertification itself. This has already been proposed and analysed as a more ‘meta’ technique, 
which addresses not only the reception, but also the drafting, of  legislative text. However, this 
kind of  technique would do very little to help the project address the substance of  sex/gender 
inequalities more broadly. Given the genealogy of  interpretation statutes in erasing female legal 
subjects, using this route within a decertification project could bring with it unhelpful 
associations, and within contemporary practice in the Westminster system (through which policy-
making and drafting are divided and distinct) it would not help ongoing feminist activist or 
policy concerns if  legislation ‘invisibilised’ sex/gender dynamics and politics. The temporality of  
interpretation statutes is also a potential issue, as they tend to look forwards and not backwards, 
leaving a legacy body of  legislation subject to a distinctly gendered regime oriented at people 






with certified sex/gender. Yet clearly interpretation statutes are also seen as a locus for legal 
change and innovation, with examples from the Welsh Assembly and Australia already referring 
to a wider range of  genders than male or female, as we have seen, and it may well be that 
attention to interpretation legislation could become one aspect of  a broader legislative approach. 
 The evolution of  new techniques of  gender-neutral drafting is positioned as a key means 
of  bringing about change in drafting overall following the 2007 government statement and 
recent moves towards ‘gender-inclusive’ and ‘gender silent’ drafting. We have already seen that 
drafters have a degree of  independence, yet they work in teams and engage in dialogue about 
drafting problems and innovations (Xanthaki, 2015), leading to incremental shifts in adoption, 
the uptake of  new techniques, and even the use of  linguistic research to help advance their 
practice (Dalmau, 2019). Essentially, then, if  we imagined that our project would respond to the 
wider legal world as it currently is, then we would be interested in how drafters would engage 
with decertification over time. If  sex were not formally recorded at birth, or not attached to a 
lifelong, gendering, system of  state identification, would this require drafters to draft sex/gender 
differently, and if  so, how? What would a move to decertify gender do to the techniques of  
gender-neutral drafting currently used by the OPC, which focus on repeating the noun, changing 
the pronoun, and rephrasing to avoid the need for a pronoun or noun?  
 It seems that decertifying gender would have most effect on the group of drafting 
techniques outlined above that focus on changing the pronoun, with possibly fewer effects on 
the other two groups of techniques. This is because gendered third person pronouns have been 
used across the statute book and it is still within drafters’ technical range to use such pronouns 
where they see fit. Decertifying sex/gender would certainly challenge the continued use of 
gendered pronouns in the third person, including the familiar “he or she” construction. Given 
that decertification would not claim to erase widespread inequalities of sex/gender, as Davina 
Cooper has pointed out (this issue), it might be possible that gendered third person pronouns 






may still be used in some circumstances when it is important to recognise the effect on an 
individual of a social system or phenomenon that is acknowledged to be gendered. This could 
apply even with the use of “they”, which is not necessarily always understood as ‘non-gendered’ 
but often as ‘gendered differently to male and female’.31 There is in any case a move away from 
using the “he or she” construction when alternatives are present and using only “he” is falling 
well outside of contemporary drafting practice, especially following the 2007 government 
statement on gender neutral drafting. Furthermore, gender-inclusive and gender silent 
approaches to drafting increasingly shift away from assuming in advance what sex/gender a legal 
subject wishes to claim.   
 It may well be that too much attention to pronouns would be inappropriate for the kind 
of re-orientation of focus that decertification would perform. If decertifying gender is about not 
putting all the work of sex/gender onto individuals to carry through their lifetime, but instead to 
focus on sex/gender as a set of social systems and institutional orientations, then the focus on 
pronouns, with their inherent targeting of gendered individuals, may shift. For this reason, our 
statutory drafting practice may focus on techniques currently used by drafters to ‘rephrase to 
avoid the need for a pronoun or noun’ (OPC 2018, 7). Given that legislation still occasionally 
needs to target legal subjects as individuals, it is possible to imagine a situation in which 
decertification might encourage drafters increasingly to use the singular “they” as a non-
gendered third person singular, and this would also align with Xanthaki’s ‘gender inclusive’ 
approach, although from a different conceptual direction.  
 Another approach might be to question the continued use of  the third person as the 
‘voice’ for legislation. This appears more radical than rephrasing to avoid the need for a pronoun, 
but both techniques effectively engage in a shift in expression. As many commentators have 
pointed out (Mossman, 1995; Salembier, 2015; Xanthaki, 2013), the issue that drafters face is that 
                                                                
31 Many thanks to Flora Renz for making this point. 






there is no gender-free third person singular pronoun in the English language – that is, if  
objections to the widespread use of  the singular “they” are taken as read. However, the second 
person (“you”) is un-gendered. The second person is often associated with the imperative, which 
is used more readily in other languages (e.g. German) and not generally considered for use in 
statutory text.32 As Salembier puts it: ‘the imperative mood (Put that cookie back in the jar) is 
commonly used for speaking but is not appropriate for legislation’ (Salembier, 2015, p. 176). The 
Office of  the Scottish Parliamentary Counsel (OSPC) has also considered the use of  the second 
person within the context of  plain language drafting. The OSPC points out that referring to 
‘you’ would catch readers of  legislative texts who are not the intended audience of  the 
obligations or rights contained in the statute, for example judges or lawyers. However, it also 
acknowledges that ‘there may occasionally be circumstances in which it may be advantageous to 
draft in the second person’.33 As the project continues investigating the rich intersections of  
sex/gender and legislative drafting, future work could focus on the potential for using the second 
person as part of  a broader set of  feminist techniques that sit comfortably with a more 
disruptive approach to drafting overall (see further below). As such, the second person might 
provide a technique for avoiding the binary dilemmas of  gendered third person pronouns, 
helping to support the decertification of  gender (along with its focus on social relations of  
gender rather than gender as an individual property of  the legal subject), and also unsettling 
communicative conventions of  drafting within broader processes of  law-making (see further 
Stefanou, 2015).  
 The second set of  questions in this final section builds on these latter concerns by asking 
how feminists can and should engage with legislative drafting. We might, for example, try to alter 
the current tools, contributing to on-going debates about sex/gender within current legislative 
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drafting practice from the perspective of  a situation in which people would not enter legal forms 
of  address with formally sexed or gendered subjectivities. Conversations about gender and 
drafting, the on-going controversy over the use of  the singular “they”, for example, and 
historical debates over the use of  interpretation statutes, all reference the performative power of  
legal statutes and their gendering effects. The unsteady histories of  sex/gender in English law as 
well as current dilemmas of  contested usage indicate that this area of  legal practice is as full of  
controversy as any other. With that in mind, it would be inaccurate to frame any feminist 
approach to drafting as challenging a monolithic institution or practice.  
 Yet writing statutes from an explicitly feminist perspective also necessarily engages 
questions of  positionality right from the outset. For feminists engaging with statute writing, 
using the tools, conventions and aesthetics of  drafting does not necessarily mean aspiring for the 
same norms of  independence and neutrality found in legislative counsel offices. However the 
need to follow something akin to the received conventions of  statutory drafting is still felt to be 
necessary in order to make a convincing enough argument about what could be different, 
substantively or formally, in the law. As Erika Rackley put it:  
… my concern with not following the rules, the traditional rules of legislation, is that you 
would end up with something that looks so different to legislation that the people would 
no longer see it as legislation. The powerful argument of “you could do it this way” 
would be much harder to make. (Interview, 2019) 
 In addition to positionality, the political and legal orientation of  feminist statute-writing 
can vary depending on whether the proposed statute is the result of  academic initiative, 
engagement with NGOs, or work undertaken for political parties. Máiréad Enright, who with 
many other feminist legal academics has co-organised and written feminist judgments as well as 
feminist legislation, spoke of  the effect on decisions about form and substance being driven 
significantly by context, as she highlights here, when speaking about the different expectations 






involved in writing proposed legislation for the Alliance for Choice in the Northern Irish 
context, compared with writing proposed legislation on abortion reform for the Irish Labour 
Party: 
Their [The Alliance for Choice] political position was “draft something that is the gold 
standard, so that we can measure whatever we get in the future or we can educate 
ourselves and we can think ourselves in terms of the gold standard”. Whereas with the 
Labour Party it was draft something that's not too frightening and that meets the 
constitutional requirements. (Interview, 2019) 
Enright refers here to ‘gold standard’ drafting, a request to draft the kind of  feminist statute that 
would recognise the ‘best’ on offer to feminists on abortion across jurisdictions, made applicable 
to the Northern Irish context. The difference between ‘gold standard’ and ‘not too frightening’, 
then, relates to content and form and can draw on very diverse sources. Yet, importantly, writing 
statutory text is felt to be a more immediate kind of  prefigurative intervention than judgment 
writing or other forms of  feminist legal praxis.  
 With these points in mind, we might aim for a believable ‘gold standard’ with the aim of  
safely persuading as many policy makers as possible of  the workability of  our proposed 
experimental stature. Or we might forge distinctly feminist tools, challenging aspects of  drafting 
practice that are currently very well embedded. There are precedents for this kind of  legal 
squatting/vandalism/re-orientation (depending on your politics): the Feminist Judgments 
project, the African Feminist Judgments project, and the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments 
projects are some examples.34 This might mean turning away from text towards performance or 
other art forms, strategically de-stabilising certain epistemologies and practices of  drafting, such 
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as the distinction between policy-making and drafting, or the tools of  neutrality, distancing, and 
objectivity that often structure current ‘best practice’ in drafting communities (Greenberg, 2011).  
 Inevitably, the process of  producing an experimental statute takes place outside of  the 
usual Westminster (or relevant other jurisdictional) processes whereby the substance of  primary 
legislation is formed through policy considerations within government departments and then 
transmitted to drafters by means of  ‘instructions’. In interviews, legislative drafters were careful 
to convey their observance of  this norm, establishing the limits to their deliberative technical 
engagement with departments. As such, any feminist attempt to use the tools of  drafting to write 
law ‘otherwise’ inevitably collapses what are considered to be important procedural distinctions 
between the policy phase and the drafting phase into each other (see further Greenberg, 2011; 
Page, 2009). Nevertheless, there may be considerable power in occupying both roles at once, 
making more radical interventions into both substance and form than would otherwise be 
expected. Precedents for this kind of  approach include the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments 
project and the Scottish Feminist Judgments project, both of  which aimed to trouble the usual 
form of  judicial writing and decision-making by involving a wider group of  artists, litigants, and 
social activists (Cowan et al., 2020; Enright et al., 2017). It will be for the next stage of  our 
research to consider whether and how to take a similar approach. 
 Finally, those who have engaged in feminist judgments or statutory drafting have become 
increasingly aware of  the limited role of  each aspect of  law-making within wider legal 
assemblages. Speaking of  the provisional power of  legislative drafting in the context of  judicial 
decision-making, one feminist academic described it as a ‘choreographed free for all’ in which 
judges had wide scope to use their tools in such a way as to read down legislative provisions if  
they wanted. As she put it: 
It's a very sort of choreographed free for all. I do think that there are hard boundaries, 
but they are pretty wide. I think that there are an awful lot of ways that judges can decide 






which particular tools they are going to deploy in a particular situation, whether it's to 
uphold something, to read it narrowly, to read it broadly, to make sense of it or to make 
nonsense of it, and then they have those options and they have the perfectly legitimate 
rational ways of making that seem inevitable. (Interview, 2019) 
These remarks point to the interconnections and relationships existing between different arenas, 
types, and registers of  law, reminding us of  the importance of  statutory interpretation alongside 
legislative drafting, and the purchase of  wider debates about the limits of  authorial power (e.g. 
Kamuf, 1988; Walker, 1990). 
 
Concluding Remarks: Grasping the Alchemy of Legal Gender 
The synthesis of  words and legal meaning, text and expression, that we find with legislative 
drafting means that ‘drafting otherwise’ is not simply a matter of  using current techniques to 
implement a new approach to legal gender, it is much more productive and political than might 
otherwise be assumed. This project has led me to become preoccupied with the question of  
whether a technology that has contributed many of  the legal categories, idioms, exclusions, and 
ideologies that contribute powerfully to norms of  sex/gender can be employed in decertifying 
gender. In line with new materialist perspectives on the ‘mattering of  methods’, I find myself  
bewitched with the politics and materiality of  text just as others ask about the ontological force 
of  legal gender and the material and political effects of  changing how sex and gender attach to 
law (Coleman et al., 2019). Over recent months, I have brought to research meetings the shiny 
things I have been finding in interviews with legislative drafters: debates over the singular “they”, 
discussions over gender in the Interpretation Act 1976, the fact that drafters know about gender-
transformative expressions of  “ze” and will readily discuss non-binary gender. These debates 
have raised second wave feminist insights about the power of  legal language – its magical quality 
– as a matter of  ongoing enquiry. Magic is, in some ways ineffable, and the legal technical 






fabrication of  sex/gender through text and innovation over the past few centuries has come to 
seem slightly more scientific, something more like alchemy. In such moments, the larger project 
of  working out what would be the implications of  dis-attaching sex/gender from legal 
personhood has appeared to be as just as much a question of  legal expression, the oddly 
tenacious power of  legal text, as about an iterative working-through of  feminist prefigurative 
legal and political thinking, requiring, as it does, careful assessment of  how this whole web of  
meaning, effect, politics, and inequality is connected. In other words, I have become entangled in 
this research somewhere between text and substance.  
 My problem is that when the task is done, we may well have expressed ourselves, again, 
through legal text and certainly, to some extent, through legal form. I cannot dis-attach my own 
involvement in this project from the emerging realisation that whatever we wish to do, 
prefigurative, revolutionary, or transformative has to engage with an archetypal practice of  law-
making that has been a ‘black box’ until very recently. The mutual inter-relationship of  
sex/gender and legislative drafting has raised more questions than it has answered, and it seems 
like risky work, having identified the alchemy, to try and harness it. Yet with such risks come new 
opportunities. I hope this article has conveyed some sense of  our statutory dilemmas as we 
continue our research on decertifying gender. 
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